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BLOOD AND BREATH TESTS—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS BLOOD AND 
BREATH TESTS INCIDENT TO DUI ARREST: IMPACT ON 
DRUNK DRIVING IN NORTH DAKOTA 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court held 
the Fourth Amendment does not allow states to conduct warrantless blood 
tests incident to an arrest for drunk driving.  Additionally, the Court limited 
the consequences of implied consent statutes and determined such consent 
only applies to conditions that are reasonable.  Therefore, the Court 
explained that motorists cannot be presumed to have consented to submit to 
an unconstitutional warrantless blood test, and their refusal cannot be 
criminalized.  The Court analyzed the totality of the circumstances in two 
basic categories to determine whether warrantless blood and breath tests are 
constitutional incident to a lawful arrest: (1) the privacy of the individual 
and (2) legitimate government concerns.  Birchfield significantly impacts 
North Dakota and its efforts in recent years to combat drunk driving 
because the legislature is now tasked with exploring effective new strategies 
that comport with the Fourth Amendment. 
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I. FACTS 
Each year, intoxicated motorists cause massive property destruction 
and injuries, many of which are fatal.1  In an effort to combat this nation-
wide epidemic, each state prohibits drunk driving when a driver’s blood 
alcohol concentration (“BAC”) exceeds a certain level.2  To measure this 
BAC level, authorities must administer a test, usually using a driver’s 
breath or blood.3  To ensure drivers suspected of drunk driving do not 
simply refuse to take the test, hindering law enforcement’s ability to impose 
penalties for breaking the law, all states have adopted implied consent 
laws.4  These laws penalize drivers who refuse testing when authorities 
have sufficient reason to believe they were driving under the influence.5  
Some states imposed civil penalties, evidentiary consequences, or both 
upon a driver’s refusal to comply with the testing procedures.6  Other states, 
 
1.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. at 2167. 
4.  Id. at 2166. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. at 2169. 
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including North Dakota, Minnesota, and eleven others, criminalized a 
driver’s refusal to submit to BAC testing after being lawfully arrested for 
drunk driving.7 
Three petitioners, Danny Birchfield, William Robert Bernard, Jr., and 
Steve Michael Beylund, challenged the constitutionality of such criminal 
refusal statutes.8  All three petitioners were arrested for driving while 
impaired and advised of their state’s implied consent statutes.9  In addition, 
each petitioner was informed that failure to comply with BAC testing would 
result in criminal penalties.10 
The first petitioner, Birchfield, refused to submit to a blood test.11  
Consequently, Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for violating the 
North Dakota refusal statute.12  Although he entered a conditional guilty 
plea, Birchfield argued that criminalizing refusal to submit to a warrantless 
blood test was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.13  The state district 
court rejected the argument, and the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed.14 
Similarly, the second petitioner, Bernard, refused to take a breath test 
and was charged with first degree test refusal, a violation of Minnesota 
law.15  The Minnesota District Court determined warrantless breath tests 
were not permitted under the Fourth Amendment, and dismissed the 
charges accordingly.16  The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.17 
The final petitioner, Beylund, agreed to have his blood drawn after he 
was informed that he would be charged with a crime upon refusal.18  Law 
 
7.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2166; Brief for Petitioner at *3 n.1, Birchfield v. North Dakota, 
136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (No. 14-1468), 2016 WL 447640.  The eleven other states with similar 
statutes include: (1) Alaska (Alaska Stat. §28.35.032); (2) Florida (Fla. Stat. §316.1932); (3) 
Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 291e-68); (4) Indiana (Ind. Code. § 9-30-7-5); (5) Kansas (Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 8-1025); (6) Louisiana (La. Stat. Ann. § 14:98.7); (7) Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-
6,197,60-6,211.02); (8) Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.1); (9) Tennessee (Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 55-10-406); (10) Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1201(b), (c)); and (11) Virginia (Va. 
Code Ann. § 18.2-268.3).  The Supreme Court of Hawaii recently held Hawaii’s compelled-
consent statute unconstitutional.  State v. Won, 361 P.3d 1195, 1198-99 (Haw. 2015). 
8.  Id. at 2170-73. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. at 2170. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170-71. 
14.  Id. at 2171. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. at 2171-72. 
         
200 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 197 
enforcement officers conducted a chemical test, which identified his BAC 
was over three times the legal limit.19  As a result, at the administrative 
hearing, the Hearing Officer chose to suspend Beylund’s driver’s license for 
two years.20  The state district court rejected Beylund’s argument that his 
consent was coerced by the officer’s warning, and the North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed.21 
While the individual circumstances of the petitioners are different, each 
petitioner’s case hinged on resolving a common issue.22  On appeal, the 
common issue was the constitutionality of warrantless blood and breath 
tests incident to a drunk driving arrest.23  If such warrantless tests are to be 
deemed constitutional, the subsequent criminalization of refusals to comply 
would be allowed.24  Alternatively, if warrantless tests are prohibited under 
the Fourth Amendment, a state may not criminalize refusals to submit to 
unconstitutional warrantless searches.25  Accordingly, the Birchfield Court 
analyzed the constitutionality of warrantless blood and breath tests incident 
to drunk driving arrest to determine if states are able to impose criminal 
penalties for BAC test refusal. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Over the past century, the United States Supreme Court has delineated 
the contours of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.26  The Fourth 
Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.27 
The Supreme Court has determined that a blood or breath test to 
determine an individual’s BAC is a search governed by the Fourth 
 
19.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172. 
26.  Id. 
27.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Amendment and must adhere to the reasonableness requirement therein.28  
Generally, a warrant must be secured to conduct searches, but this 
requirement is subject to a number of exceptions.29  Relevant here are the 
exigent circumstances and search incident to arrest exceptions.30 
A. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION 
The United States Supreme Court has established an exception to the 
warrant requirement for exigent circumstances.31  This exception allows 
authorities to conduct a warrantless search when circumstances surrounding 
an emergency leave insufficient time to obtain a valid warrant and prompt 
action is required.32  Prior to Birchfield, the Supreme Court contemplated 
the application of this exception in two drunk driving cases, Schmerber v. 
California and Missouri v. McNeely.33 
In Schmerber, the Supreme Court determined an exigent circumstance 
was presented when law enforcement officers sought to obtain the BAC of 
a driver who was receiving treatment for car accident injuries.34  The Court 
reasoned the circumstances constituted an emergency suitable for a 
warrantless search because “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to 
diminish shortly after drinking stops.”35  More recently, the McNeely Court 
narrowed the application of the exigent circumstances exception in drunk 
driving cases.36  The Court did not allow the ruling in Schmerber to extend 
to all drunk driving cases.37  Accordingly, it mandated a case-by-case 
application of the exception based on the totality of the circumstances, 
holding that a categorical application of this exception is inappropriate.38 
B. SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST EXCEPTION 
The second relevant exception to the reasonableness requirement is the 
search incident to arrest exception.39  Even before the adoption of the 
 
28.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 
616-17 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)). 
29.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)). 
30.  Id. at 2173-74. 
31.  Id. at 2173 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. (discussing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 770-72; Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
1552, 1560-61 (2013)). 
34.  Id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 770-72). 
35.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173-74 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). 
36.  Id. at 2174 (citing McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1560-61). 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. (citing McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 n.3). 
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Fourth Amendment, this exception was recognized.40  The Supreme Court 
finally addressed the exception in dicta and confirmed the right “to search 
the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the 
fruits or evidence of crime.”41  In subsequent years, the Court attempted to 
delineate the contours of this exception until it provided some clarity in 
Chimel v. California.42  Chimel provided a general rule allowing arresting 
officers to search both “the person arrested” and “the area ‘within his 
immediate control.’”43  The purpose of this type of search is two-fold: first, 
it promotes the safety of the officer by preventing the arrestee from 
accessing a weapon, and second, it prevents the destruction of evidence.44 
This exception was further clarified by the Court in United States v. 
Robinson, authorizing a categorical application of the exception to all 
lawful custodial arrests.45  Recently in Riley v. California, the Court 
reaffirmed the categorical application of the rule and considered its use in 
situations that were not envisioned when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.46  Further, the Court provided an analytical framework to address 
these new situations: a court must analyze “the degree to which [breath and 
blood tests] intrud[e] upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to 
which [breath and blood tests are] needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.”47  The Birchfield Court proceeded to analyze the 
reasonableness of warrantless breath and blood tests under this standard 
because the technology used to conduct such tests was not envisioned when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.48 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court, with Justice Alito 
writing for the majority,49 ruled the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement for warrantless searches was satisfied in warrantless breath 
tests incident to drunk driving arrests, but not in warrantless blood tests 
 
40.  Id. at 2174-75. 
41.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2175 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 
(1914)). 
42.  Id. at 2175. 
43.  Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754 (1969)). 
44.  Id.; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
45.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2175-76 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 
(1973)). 
46.  Id. at 2176. 
47.  Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2014). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 2166. 
         
2016] CASE COMMENT 203 
incident to the same.50  The Court employed the Riley test to balance 
individual privacy concerns with the degree to which the government needs 
warrantless searches to promote its legitimate interests.51  The Court noted 
breath tests were minimally invasive, unlikely to cause great 
embarrassment, and give limited information; therefore, the privacy 
concerns did not outweigh the need to preserve public highway safety.52  
The Court, however, noted blood tests were significantly more intrusive and 
allowed for a plethora of information beyond a mere BAC calculation to be 
gleaned from the blood sample.53  In light of a less intrusive, alternative 
way of measuring BAC, the privacy concerns were greater than the need to 
preserve public highway safety; thus, warrantless blood tests were found 
unconstitutional.54  Accordingly, states cannot criminalize refusal to submit 
to an unconstitutional warrantless search.55 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are prohibited 
except in cases where an exception applies.56  The Court followed prior 
case law and did not categorically apply the exigent circumstances 
exception.57  Rather, the Birchfield majority analyzed the constitutionality 
of warrantless breath and blood tests separately under the search incident to 
arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.58 
1. Constitutionality of Warrantless Breath Tests 
The Court began by analyzing the impact of a warrantless breath test 
on individual privacy interests.59  Prior Supreme Court caselaw has 
determined breath tests do not “implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.”60  
Moreover, the Court pointed to three reasons this determination remains 
accurate.61 
 
50.  Id. at 2185. 
51.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176. 
52.  Id. at 2176-78. 
53.  Id. at 1278. 
54.  Id. at 2184. 
55.  Id. at 2186. 
56.  Id. at 2173. 
57.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (citing McNeely v. Missouri, 133 S. Ct. 1521, 1556 
(2013)). 
58.  Id. at 2176. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. at 2176-77. 
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First, the Court described the physical intrusion of a breath test as 
“almost negligible.”62  The process of a breath test entails no more effort 
than it would take to blow up a party balloon.63  More specifically, the 
process requires one to blow continuously for four to fifteen seconds into a 
mouthpiece similar to a straw connected to the testing machine.64  The 
Court likened this process to the common usage of straws in today’s 
society.65  Additionally, the Court did not entertain an argument concerning 
a possessory interest or emotional attachment to air exhalation from the 
body.66  Finally, the Court looked to prior decisions and determined a 
breath test was no more intrusive than the “negligible” intrusion of a buccal 
swab to collect DNA or the “very limited intrusion” of scraping under a 
suspect’s fingernails to obtain evidence.67  Accordingly, the procedure is 
not excessively intrusive.68 
Second, the breath test allows authorities to get one, and only one, 
piece of information, the arrestee’s BAC level.69  Once the level is read, 
authorities no longer possess anything that may be used to get further 
information about the arrestee.70  The Court noted that this contrasts from 
the DNA swabs mentioned before, because the DNA obtained via a buccal 
swab had the potential to give the authorities a plethora of “highly personal 
information” far beyond a mere calculation of the level of alcohol on one’s 
breath.71 
Finally, submitting to a breath test is not likely to exacerbate 
embarrassment beyond what is inherent in any arrest.72  The Court noted the 
test in itself is not inherently embarrassing.73  Additionally, the Court 
recognized the tests are usually conducted outside the public view.74  
Although there is not an increased amount of embarrassment, the Court 
concluded by mentioning when a person is under arrest, the expectation of 
privacy is diminished.75  Accordingly, the Court echoed prior caselaw and 
 
62.  Id. at 2176. 
63.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177. 
64.  Id. at 2176. 
65.  Id. at 2177. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. (citing Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 
291, 296 (1973)). 
68.  Id. 
69.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. (discussing King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969). 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177. 
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agreed that breath testing still does not “implicat[e] significant privacy 
concerns.”76 
Next, the Court analyzed the degree to which the government needs the 
BAC reading of individuals arrested for drunk driving to promote legitimate 
government interests.77  Two reasons were discussed regarding the 
government’s interest in obtaining the BAC reading.78  The Court discussed 
the importance of public highway safety and the need to deter individuals 
from driving under the influence.79 
First, the Court recognized the government’s continued “paramount 
interest . . . in preserving the safety . . . of public highways.”80  
Additionally, alcohol consumption is the leading cause of traffic fatalities 
and injuries.81  Thus, the Court reasoned the government has an interest in 
obtaining BAC levels in an effort to combat the “carnage” and “slaughter” 
caused by drunk drivers.82  Second, the Court discussed the government’s 
interest in creating a deterrent effect on drivers to combat the threat of 
drunk driving before it ever happens.83 
Today, the Court’s determination that breath tests do not implicate 
significant privacy concerns has not strayed.84  Moreover, the government 
continues to have a paramount interest in implementing legal consequences 
for drunk driving to protect public roadways.85  Therefore, because the 
government’s need for BAC testing outweighs the slight impact of breath 
tests on privacy, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests 
incident to lawful drunk driving arrests.86 
2. Constitutionality of Warrantless Blood Tests 
The Court used the same framework to analyze the constitutionality of 
warrantless blood tests.87  Accordingly, the Court began by clearly 
differentiating blood tests from breath tests for two reasons.88  First, a blood 
test involves extracting a part of an arrestee’s body through piercing his or 
 
76.  Id. at 2178. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at 2178-79. 
80.  Id. (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)). 
81.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. at 2179. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 2178. 
86.  Id. at 2184. 
87.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178. 
88.  Id. 
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her skin; therefore, it is significantly more intrusive than blowing into a 
tube.89  Second, a blood sample extraction would allow authorities to access 
a wealth of information beyond a mere BAC calculation.90  In addition, the 
Court even noted that if authorities limited the use of the blood sample to 
just BAC calculation, the extraction alone may result in increased anxiety 
of potential information being disclosed.91  For these reasons, there are 
more privacy concerns in blood testing than breath testing.92 
The Court pointed to the same asserted need to obtain BAC readings as 
in the above breath test constitutionality discussion.93  The Court noted 
there was no additional reasoning asserted for the significantly more 
intrusive blood testing to ascertain BAC readings.94  Thus, in light of a less 
intrusive, alternative method, the Court determined the privacy concerns 
were sufficient to render warrantless blood tests unreasonable, and therefore 
unconstitutional.95 
3. Majority Conclusion 
Accordingly, the Court determined warrantless breath tests, but not 
blood tests, incident to drunk driving arrests are reasonable.96  This 
determination affects the states’ ability to criminalize refusal to comply 
with such testing.97  The Court borrows from Fifth Amendment precedent 
to determine motorists can only consent to reasonable conditions.98  Thus, 
because warrantless blood tests are found unreasonable, motorists cannot be 
presumed to have consented to a blood test and criminalized for refusal of 
the same.99 
The following paragraph explains the application of the Court’s legal 
conclusions to the facts at hand.  Law enforcement officers threatened the 
first petitioner, Birchfield, with an unlawful search.100  Based on that 
search, Birchfield was unlawfully convicted for refusing to submit to the 
blood test; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded to the North Dakota 
 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178-79. 
94.  Id. at 2184. 
95.  Id. at 2185. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. at 2185-86. 
98.  Id. at 2186. 
99.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186 
100.  Id. 
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Supreme Court.101  The second petitioner, Bernard, had no right to refuse 
the warrantless breath test because the test is permissible incident to a drunk 
driving arrest; therefore, the Court affirmed the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision.102  Finally, the third petitioner, Beylund, submitted to a blood test 
after police told him that the law required his submission.103  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court based its conclusion of Beylund’s voluntary consent 
on the incorrect assumption that the state could compel blood tests; 
therefore, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision and 
remanded to the North Dakota Supreme Court.104 
B. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Justices Sotomayor105 and Thomas106 wrote partial dissents in 
Birchfield.  Both dissents rested on the appropriate application, categorical 
or case-by-case, of the relevant exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement.107  Justice Sotomayor advocated for a case-by-case 
approach, requiring a warrant in all cases except when exigent 
circumstances provide an exception to the requirement.108  Alternatively, 
Justice Thomas advocated for a categorical application of the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for all BAC tests, blood 
and breath tests alike.109 
1. Justice Sotomayor’s Partial Dissent 
In the first Birchfield partial dissent, Justice Sotomayor, in which 
Justice Ginsburg joined, disagreed with the majority’s categorical 
exemption of breath tests from the warrant requirement under the search 
incident to arrest doctrine, calling its application a “considerable 
overgeneralization.”110  Rather, she argued that the search incident to arrest 
exception should be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine 
reasonableness.111  She reasoned that law enforcement officers are not 
authorized to conduct unreasonable searches based solely on the arrest of a 
 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. at 2186-87. 
105.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187. 
106.  Id. at 2196. 
107.  Id. at 2187-98. 
108.  Id. at 2188-89. 
109.  Id. at 2197-98. 
110.  Id. at 2191, 2195 & n. 3. 
111.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2195. 
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suspect.112  Therefore, Justice Sotomayor advocated that all blood and 
breath tests incident to drunk driving arrests be subjected to the warrant 
requirement. 
She supported her argument by pointing to the timeline of 
administration of breath tests and law enforcement’s common practice 
allowing plenty of time to obtain a warrant.113  More specifically, breath 
tests are usually conducted after the driver is arrested and taken to a police 
station, observed for fifteen to twenty minutes, given a certain amount of 
time to contact his or her attorney, and, in some cases, up to thirty minutes 
to prepare the testing machine.114  In total, Minnesota and North Dakota 
allow the police a two-hour period of time from the traffic stop until the 
administration of the breath test, which is sufficient to obtain a search 
warrant.115 
In addition to the time available to secure a warrant, Justice Sotomayor 
shed light on the “advances in technology that now permit ‘the more 
expeditious processing of warrant applications.’”116  She also stressed that 
the warrant requirement would apply only to those arrestees who refuse 
breath tests.117  Moreover, this burden would not be excessive on 
government officials, estimating the increased burden on the magistrates in 
North Dakota and Minnesota would be no more than one warrant per 
week.118  Justice Sotomayor made clear there are other judicial tools 
available to force compliance even with a warrant requirement, such as 
imposing criminal punishment due to obstructing justice by not adhering to 
a lawfully obtained search warrant.119 
Overall, when applying the search incident to arrest doctrine to blood 
and breath tests, Justice Sotomayor contends the best way to evaluate which 
exception is proper to apply is to “ask whether the exception best addresses 
the nature of the postarrest search and the needs it fulfills.”120  The purpose 
of the search incident to arrest exception is to preserve evidence that may be 
destroyed before procuring a warrant.121  Given the usual timeline allotted 
between the stop and the breath test, the purpose of the exception is usually 
 
112.  Id. at 2195-96. 
113.  Id. at 2192. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at 2192-93. 
116.  Id. at 2192 (quoting McNeely v. Missouri, 133 S. Ct. 1521, 1562 (2013)). 
117.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2193. 
118.  Id. at 2193-94. 
119.  Id. at 2194. 
120.  Id. at 2196. 
121.  Id. 
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not fulfilled in the case of breath tests.122  Thus, it is inappropriate to 
categorically apply this exception to all breath tests because it does not 
comport with the exception’s purpose.123  In conclusion, Justice Sotomayor 
expressed her concern that if the Court continues down the current path, the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment will be a mere suggestion 
rather than a constitutional requirement.124 
2. Justice Thomas’ Partial Dissent 
In the second Birchfield partial dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed with 
the majority’s nitpicking regarding where to draw a distinction between 
blood and breath tests.125  He referred to the distinction as “an arbitrary line 
in the sand” and argued what should have been resolved was whether “the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception permits bodily searches to prevent the 
destruction of BAC evidence.”126  Justice Thomas finds little support in the 
Court’s precedent for the compromise of allowing warrantless breath tests 
but not warrantless blood tests.127 
Justice Thomas finds the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement more appropriate in this situation.128  He contends, as 
he also proposed in McNeely, that “the natural metabolization of [BAC] 
creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is 
drunk” and it follows that both warrantless blood and breath tests are 
constitutional.129  Justice Thomas continues by expressing concern that the 
Birchfield majority drew a distinction between types of BAC evidence 
when analyzing the search incident to arrest exception, but did not allow 
such a distinction in McNeely when the Court found inappropriate a 
categorical application of the exigency exception for all BAC 
calculations.130 
In conclusion, Justice Thomas suggested the McNeely Court was wrong 
in its determination that the natural dissipation over time of BAC evidence 
could not categorically create an exigency in every drunk driving case.131  
Thus, in this case, he argues both warrantless blood and breath tests should 
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be constitutional via the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement.132 
IV. IMPACT 
In 2013, North Dakota passed legislation making an initial refusal to 
take a BAC test a misdemeanor offense punishable in the same manner as 
driving under the influence.133  Such penalties apply to refusals of blood, 
breath, and urine testing.134  Penalties include mandatory addiction 
treatment and sentences ranging from a mandatory fine of $500 to 
imprisonment of at least one year and one day.135 
The clear application of this case to North Dakota law will be a change 
in the current law and an effect on pending and future cases that present 
these issues.  Prosecutors will be required to advise law enforcement 
officers on new law-abiding procedures that deviate from what the statute 
currently dictates and law enforcement’s previous practices.  This 
advisement will ensure the state is successful in deterring drunk driving 
through the prosecution of these offenses and in enhancing public policy 
regarding safety on the roads, ultimately preventing the loss of innocent 
lives due to drunk driving. 
Moving forward, the North Dakota legislature needs to consider the 
pros and cons of blood testing.  If the legislature determines blood testing is 
the best option for obtaining evidence in drunk driving prosecutions, it will 
likely need to develop a system that allows for prompt and effective 
issuance of search warrants for arrestees who refuse to submit to blood 
testing.  Alternatively, if the legislature determines breath testing is an 
adequate way to calculate BAC for drunk driving prosecutions, it can likely 
continue to inform drivers that their refusal to submit to a breath test is a 
crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence.  
Either way, the Birchfield Court paved the way for the commencement of 
the legislative process in North Dakota.  The state is now tasked with 
implementing creative and effective solutions to the ongoing issue of 
drunk driving while remaining within the bounds of the Constitution.  
Birchfield provides a platform for the North Dakota legislature to step in 
and take over.  The legislature must balance North Dakota’s interest in 
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protecting its public roads with the privacy interests of North Dakota 
citizens to create an effective strategy for all. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court held warrantless breath 
tests, but not blood tests, incident to lawful drunk driving arrests are 
constitutional under the search incident to arrest doctrine.136  The Court 
reasoned because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests 
and provide law enforcement with information necessary to serve their 
interests in promoting public road safety,137 warrantless breath tests are 
reasonable, and, therefore, constitutional.138  Because the Court found 
warrantless blood tests unconstitutional, it subsequently determined states 
cannot criminalize an arrestee’s refusal to comply with the same.139  This 
determination directly impacts North Dakota’s criminal refusal statute, and 
in turn, may affect the impact of drunk driving in North Dakota.  In 
response to this decision, the North Dakota legislature is tasked with 
determining how to proceed to effectuate new strategies that both protect 
the public roadways and comport with the Fourth Amendment. 
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